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AMELIORATING THE HARSH EFFECTS OF
WISCONSIN'S MUNICIPAL NOTICE OF
CLAIM STATUTE
I. INTRODUCrION
Under Wisconsin's municipal notice of claim statute,' a claimant
must, as a condition precedent to suit, follow certain procedural require-
ments before commencing a lawsuit against a municipality2 or a munici-
pal employee. The most stringent of these requirements is that notice
must be provided to the municipality within 120 days after the event
giving rise to the injury. The general rule states that failure to comply
with the 120-day requirement is fatal to the claimant's cause of action.
In this way, the 120-day requirement often operates as a truncated stat-
ute of limitations.3
1. Wis. STAT. § 893.80 (1991-92) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Except as provided in subs (1m) and (1p), no action may be brought or main-
tained against any volunteer fire company organized under ch. 213, political corpora-
tion, governmental subdivision or agency thereof nor against any officer, official, agent
or employe of the corporation, subdivision or agency for acts done in their official
capacity or in the course of their agency or employment upon a claim or cause of action
unless:
(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the event giving rise to the claim, writ-
ten notice of the circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent or attorney is
served on the volunteer fire company, political corporation, governmental subdivision
or agency and on the officer, official, agent or employee under s. 801.11. Failure to give
the requisite notice shall not bar action on the claim if the fire company, corporation,
subdivision or agency had actual notice of the claim and the claimant shows to the
satisfaction of the court that the delay or failure to give the requisite notice has not
been prejudicial to the defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision or agency or
to the defendant officer, official, agent or employe; and
(b) A claim containing the address of the claimant and an itemized statement of the
relief sought is presented to the appropriate clerk or person who performs the duties of
a clerk or secretary for the defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision or agency
and the claim is disallowed. Failure of the appropriate body to disallow within 120 days
after presentation is disallowance.... No action on a claim against any defendant...
may be brought after 6 months from the date of service of the notice, and the notice
shall contain a statement to that effect.
2. "'Municipality' means any county, city, village, town, school district (as enumerated in
s. 67.01(5)), sewer district, drainage district, and, without restriction because of failure of
enumeration, any other political subdivision." Wis. STAT. § 345.05 (1991-92).
3. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 155 (1988) (White, J., concurring). While in practice
the notice of claim statute often has the same effect as a statute of limitations, the view that
such statutes are essentially statutes of limitations has been rejected. See Mannino v. Daven-
port, 99 Wis. 2d 602, 607, 299 N.W.2d 823, 828 (1981). The notice of claim statute "is not a
statute of limitation but imposes a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action."
Nelson v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 262 Wis. 271, 276, 55 N.W.2d 13, 15 (1952).
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However, a claimant may invoke an exception to the general rule if
the claimant can show that the municipality had actual knowledge that
the claimant intended to hold the municipality responsible and that the
municipality was not prejudiced by the lack of formal written notice
within the 120-day notice period. Regardless of who wins the motion for
summary judgment, the notice requirement serves as a front-line defense
for municipalities and an immediate obstacle for claimants to overcome.
After providing a historical backdrop, this Comment will examine
the 120-day notice rule and the other requirements of the municipal no-
tice of claim statute. The focus will then turn to the purposes of the
statute and the means by which the Wisconsin Supreme Court has at-
tempted to ameliorate some of its harsh consequences. Specifically, the
doctrine of substantial compliance and the statutory actual notice excep-
tion will be discussed. Finally, this Comment will offer a recommenda-
tion that would bring equity and consistency to this area of the law.
1-1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Notice of claim statutes stem from the common law doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity.4 This doctrine was premised on the dual ideology that
"the King can do no wrong," and that it would be inconsistent with his
sovereignty to subject him to suit in his own courts.5 In the 1788 case of
Russell v. Men of Devon,6 an English court created the doctrine of gov-
ernmental, or municipal,7 immunity by extending the concept of sover-
eign immunity to local units of government.8
4. An "immunity" is the avoidance of "liability in tort under all circumstances, within the
limits of the immunity itself; it is conferred, not because of the particular facts, but because of
the status ... of the favored defendant; and it does not deny the tort, but the resulting liabil-
ity." WiLUAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 970 (4th ed. 1971). For a detailed discussion of
sovereign immunity in Wisconsin, see Janet S. Harring & Sidney L. Harring, Comment, State
Immunity from Suit Without Consen4 Scope and Implications, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 879.
5. See Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 52
(1926); PROSSER, supra note 4, at 975. Justice Holmes later explained the ideology as follows:
"A sovereign is exempt from suit.., on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907), superceded by statute as stated in
Burdinie v. Glendale Heights, 565 N.E.2d (Ill. 1990).
6. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
7. Wisconsin courts interchangeably refer to the doctrine as "governmental" or "munici-
pal" immunity. See eg., Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 29, 115 N.W.2d 618, 620
(1962).
8. Sovereign immunity is most easily understood as immunity as it applies to the State.
Governmental or municipal immunity is most easily understood as immunity as it applies to
local governments. For an explanation of this distinction, see generally Apfelbacher v. State,
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In Russell, the plaintiff brought an action against the County of
Devon to recover for damages that his wagon incurred when it struck a
hole in a County of Devon bridge.9 Fearing recovery would result in "an
infinity of actions" and recognizing that the unincorporated county had
no corporate fund out of which satisfaction could be made, the court
extended immunity to the local government.10 The court justified its de-
cision on the ground that it is better for an individual to suffer a loss than
it is to "inconvenience" the public.'1
After its introduction to this country,' 2 the doctrine of governmental
immunity quickly pervaded the American courts. Dissatisfied, however,
with the rationale in Russell, these courts developed new justifications
for governmental immunity. For example: municipalities perform non-
profit governmental functions that are solely for the benefit of the public
and, therefore, should not be subject to liability;' 3 governmental agents
would be unable to effectively perform if their actions were subject to
liability;' 4 and diverting tax revenues from public use to redress the torts
160 Wis. 565, 152 N.W. 144 (1915); see also Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457,460
(Cal. 1961).
Governmental immunity is inextricably linked to sovereign immunity, since the former
stems from the latter. In Wisconsin, the municipality was viewed as a representative of the
sovereign and, therefore, was afforded the benefit of governmental immunity. See Britten v.
City of Eau Claire, 260 Wis. 382,51 N.W.2d 30 (1952); see also Patricia Godfrey, Note, Torts-
Municipal Corporations-Abolition of the Doctrine of Immunity, 45 MARO. L. REv. 452
(1961-62).
The application of immunity to state governments often meant an automatic extension of
immunity to state agencies. See Harold D. Gordon, Note, Notice of Claim Provisions: An
Equal Protection Perspective, 60 CORNELL L. Rlv. 417, 419 n.14 (1975); Note, The Applicabil-
ity of Sovereign Immunity to Independent Public Authorities, 74 HARV. L. REv. 714 (1961).
However, American courts generally relied on the inherent immunity rationale espoused in
Russell. See, e.g., Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 250 (1812), overruled by
Whitney v. Worcester, 366 N.E.2d 721 (Mass. 1983).
9. Russell, 100 Eng. Rep. at 359-60.
10. Id. at 362.
11. Id. Legal scholars have sharply criticized the reasoning in Russell. Professor Edwin
Borchard, in what remains the preeminent historical exposition on governmental immunity,
argued that public inconvenience cannot justify the destruction of individual rights. Edwin
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25); see also PROSSER,
supra note 4, at 978 ("[I]t is better that the losses due to tortious conduct should fall upon the
municipality rather than the injured individual, and that the torts of public employees are
properly to be regarded.., as a cost of the administration of government, which should be
distributed by taxes to the public.").
12. Governmental immunity was introduced to America by Riddle v. Proprietors of the
Locks & Canals, 7 Mass. 169 (1810) (dicta), and subsequently adopted as law in Mower, 9
Mass. at 250.
13. See, e.g., Howard v. City of Worchester, 153 Mass. 426 (1891); Hill v. City of Boston,
122 Mass. 344 (1877); see also PROSSER, supra note 4, at 978 n.76.
14. See Borchard, supra note 11, at 229; Godfrey, supra note 8, at 453.
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of governmental employees would render local government ineffec-
tual. 5 As with the initial reasoning employed by the court in Russell,
legal scholars refuted these justifications.' 6
In Wisconsin, the supreme court wholly adopted the doctrine of gov-
ernmental immunity in the 1873 case of Hayes v. City of Oshkosh.17 The
Hayes court justified the doctrine as follows:
The grounds of exemption from liability... are, that the corpora-
tion is engaged in the performance of a public service, in which it
has no particular interest, and from which it derives no special
benefit or advantage in its corporate capacity, but which it is
bound to see performed in pursuance of a duty imposed by law
for the general welfare of the inhabitants, or the community.' 8
Notwithstanding this justification, the inequities caused by the doc-
trine prompted later Wisconsin courts and legislatures to carve various
exceptions from the rule.'9 Judicial efforts to mitigate the inequities of
the rule focused primarily on the "highly artificial"20 distinction between
proprietary and governmental activities.2' Activities that a municipality
engaged in as a subdivision of the state and that were political in nature
were generally considered to be governmental activities.22 Conversely,
activities that a municipality engaged in as a corporate entity and that
were private in nature were generally considered to be proprietary activ-
ities?3 Governmental activities enjoyed immunity, whereas proprietary
activities did not.24
15. See, e.g., Coolidge v. Brookline, 114 Mass. 592 (1874).
16. See Borchard, supra note 11, at 129,229 (stating that tortious conduct should be inhib-
ited, not encouraged); Edgar Fuller & A. James Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation,
54 HARv. L. REV. 437 (1941); Leon Green, Freedom of Litigation (III): Municipal Liability for
Torts, 38 U. Ii.L. L. REV. 355 (1944); Albert J. Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corpora-
tions, 4 IL. L.Q. 28 (1921).
17. 33 Wis. 314 (1873), overruled by Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115
N.W.2d 618 (1962).
18. Id. at 318.
19. See Godfrey, supra note 8, at 454. The general rule in Wisconsin, and elsewhere, was
that governmental units were not subject to liability unless liability was mandated by statute.
Joseph M. Bernstein, Comment, Governmental Tort Liability and Immunity in Wisconsin, 1961
Wis. L. REv. 486, 489.
20. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 32, 115 N.W.2d 618, 621 (1962).
21. See, e.g., Carlson v. Marinette County, 264 Wis. 423, 59 N.W.2d 486 (1953); Christian
v. City of New London, 234 Wis. 123, 290 N.W. 621 (1940); Highway Trailer Co. v. Janesville
Elec. Co., 187 Wis. 161, 204 N.W. 773 (1925).
22. See Bernstein, supra note 19, at 488.
23. See id.
24. There is general agreement that the proprietary-governmental distinction left the law
in a veritable state of confusion. See Lindemeyer v. City of Milwaukee, 241 Wis. 637, 644, 6
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Independent of the governmental-proprietary distinction, Wisconsin
courts also applied a "governor to governed" test.2 Under this test, mu-
nicipalities were held responsible for nuisance where no "governor to
governed" relationship existed between the municipality and the claim-
ant.2 6 Generally, a governor to governed relationship would exist when
a party was injured while using a public facility for its intended use. 7
For example, such a relationship was held to exist when a child was in-
jured while playing in a public swimming pool, but not when the child
was injured while playing in a garbage dump.28
Legislative efforts to mitigate the inequities of the doctrine produced
statutes such as the highway defects statute,2 9 the safe place statute,30 the
judgments against public officers statute,31 and the motor vehicle acci-
dent statute.32 These statutes enabled injured parties to sue local gov-
ernments under specific, highly controlled circumstances. However,
even when such an exception applied, municipal tort victims were still
not placed on equal footing with private tort victims.
With the expansion of municipal tort liability, a fear arose that local
governments would be inundated with specious claims.33 As a result,
statutory exceptions to the common law doctrine of governmental im-
munity were accompanied by notice of claim provisions. These provi-
sions generally required a claimant to submit to the municipality, within
a time period ranging from thirty to ninety days after the date of injury,
a written statement (1) describing the place where the injury occurred
and the nature of the injury and (2) declaring an intent to hold the mu-
N.W.2d 653, 657 (1942); see also PROSSER, supra note 4, at 979. For a more thorough discus-
sion of the governmental-proprietary distinction, see Bernstein, supra note 19, at 486-88.
25. See, eg., Pohland v. City of Sheboygan, 251 Wis. 20, 27 N.W.2d 736 (1947), overruled
by Marshall v. Green Bay, 18 Wis. 2d 496, 118 N.W.2d 715 (1963); Erickson v. Village of West
Salem, 205 Wis. 107, 236 N.W. 579 (1931).
26. See, e.g., Flamingo v. City of Waukesha, 262 Wis. 219, 55 N.W.2d 24 (1952); Robb v.
City of Milwaukee, 241 Wis. 432, 6 N.W.2d 222 (1942). As with the proprietary-governmental
distinction, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has criticized the "governor to governed" test as
creating an "artificial" distinction. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 32, 115 N.W.2d
618, 621 (1962). For further discussion and criticism of the "governor to governed" test, see
Bernstein, supra note 19, at 497.
27. See Bernstein, supra note 19, at 486-88.
28. See id.
29. Wis. STAT. § 1339 (1878) (current version at Wis. STAT. § 81.15 (1991-92)).
30. Wis. STAT. § 2394-41 (1911) (current version at Wis. STAT. §§ 101.01, 101.11 (1991-
92)).
31. Wis. STAT. § 270.58 (1943) (current version at Wis. STAT. §§ 895.46,893.80 (1991-92)).
32. Wis. STAT. § 345.05 (1959) (current version at Wis. STAT. § 345.05 (1991-92)).
33. See Nielsen v. Town of Silver Cliff, 112 Wis. 2d 574, 580, 334 N.W.2d 242,245 (1983).
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nicipality responsible.3 The filing of a timely notice of claim was a con-
dition precedent to recovery.35
In light of the contemporaneous expansion of municipal tort liability,
these early notice of claim statutes were generally praised.36 This praise
came notwithstanding that the notice of claim provisions were generally
held to require strict compliance 37 and were merely a vestige of the
highly criticized doctrine of governmental immunity.
In the 1962 case of Holytz v. City of Milwaukee,38 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court prospectively abrogated the principle of governmental
immunity.39 The court stressed that "so far as governmental responsibil-
ity for torts is concerned, the rule is liability-the exception is immu-
nity."4 In reaching its conclusion, the court embraced the universal
34. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 1339 (1878). Wisconsin's highway defects statute contained the
state's first statewide notice of claim provision. Id.; see also Benson v. City of Madison, 101
Wis. 312, 77 N.W. 161 (1898) (requiring location of injury to be sufficiently definite); Sowle V.
City of Tomah, 81 Wis. 349, 51 N.W. 571 (1892) (requiring notice of claim to be stated with
reasonable certainty).
35. See Rudolph v. Currer, 5 Wis. 2d 639, 94 N.W.2d 132 (1959), overruled by Radtke v.
City of Milwaukee, 116 Wis. 2d 550, 342 N.W.2d 435 (1984) (holding that because plaintiff's
right to sue a municipality is purely statutory, failure to comply with conditions imposed by
legislature are fatal to plaintiff's cause of action); Sowle v. City of Tomah, 81 Wis. 349, 51
N.W. 571 (1892) (holding that notice is a statutory condition precedent to maintaining an
action); Dorsey v. City of Racine, 60 Wis. 292, 18 N.W. 928 (1884) (holding that notice is a
condition precedent to suit).
36. See Henry S. Sahm, Tort Notice of Claim to Municipalities, 46 DICK. L. REv. 1, 11
(1941); Note, Tort Actions Against Municipalities-Desirability of Uniform Period Following
Accident Within Which Notice Must Be Given, 24 VA. L. REv. 86, 88 (1937).
37. 1 EuGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.154 (3d ed.
1977 & Supp. 1993).
38. 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
39. Id. at 35, 115 N.W.2d at 626. The proper role of the court was also at issue in Holytz
because the court had previously stated that any proposed change in the doctrine of govern-
mental immunity should be directed at the legislature. See Britten v. Eau Claire, 260 Wis. 382,
51 N.W.2d 30 (1951). The Holytz court cleared this hurdle by reasoning that because the
doctrine was judicially created, it could be judicially abrogated. Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 36, 115
N.W.2d at 623.
The Florida Supreme Court, in 1957, led the way in abolishing the doctrine of governmen-
tal immunity. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957). By 1978, over half
of the States had either judicially or legislatively abolished the doctrine. 18 McQuiLUN, supra
note 37, § 53.0(a) n.5.
40. Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 39, 115 N.W.2d at 625. Qualifying as an exception, the exercise
of legislative or judicial or quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions will not subject local
governments to liability. Id. at 40, 115 N.W.2d at 625.
Although Holytz dealt specifically with governmental immunity as it applied to a city, the
court made clear that its decision applies to the "state, counties, cities, villages, towns, school
districts, sewer districts, drainage districts, and any other political subdivisions of the state-
whether they be incorporated or not." Id. Furthermore, governmental units may be held lia-
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scholarly condemnation of governmental immunity:41 "'[T]he rule of
... immunity is unjust, unsupported by any valid reason, and has no
rightful place in modern day society.'42. . .'The municipal corporation
today is an active and virile creature capable of inflicting much harm. Its
civil responsibility should be coextensive.' ,43
In addition, the court emphasized the fundamental unfairness of the
rule.
It is almost incredible that in this modern age of comparative so-
ciological enlightenment ... [we] should exempt the various
branches of the government from liability for their torts, and that
the entire burden of damage resulting from the wrongful acts of
the government should be imposed upon the single individual
who suffers the injury, rather than distributed among the entire
community constituting the government, where it could be borne
without hardship upon any individual, and where it justly
belongs."
Upon judicially abrogating governmental immunity, however, the
court explained that, if public policy so dictated, the legislature was free
to reinstate immunity.4 5 As an alternative, the court suggested that the
legislature impose a ceiling on governmental liability and implement no-
tice provisions like those found in section 81.15 of the Wisconsin
Statutes.!6
The legislative response was quick and favorable. In 1963, the legis-
lature effectively codified the Holytz decision in section 331.43 of the
Wisconsin Statutes.47 In so doing, the legislature elected to expose Wis-
consin's local governments to liability and defense costs. To assist in
controlling those costs, the statute contained a damage cap4s and a 120-
ble in damages for the negligence of their employees under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior. l
41. "'There are probably few tenets of American jurisprudence which have been so unani-
mously berated as the governmental-immunity doctrine." Id at 33, 115 N.W.2d at 621.
42. Id. at 34, 115 N.W.2d at 622 (quoting Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No.
302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 (Il1. 1959)), cerL denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
43. Id. at 35, 115 N.W.2d at 622 (quoting Harno, supra note 16, at 42).
44. Id. at 34, 115 N.W.2d at 622 (quoting Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 136 P.2d 480, 482
(N.M. 1943)).
45. Id. at 40, 115 N.W.2d at 625.
46. Id
47. 1963 Wis. Laws ch. 198.
48. Under Wis. STAT. § 331.43(2) (1963), damages were limited to $25,000. In compari-
son, the present notice of claim statute limits damages against governmental entities to
$50,000, except for volunteer fire companies organized under chapter 213, which enjoy a
$25,000 limit. See Wis. STAT. § 893.80(3) (1991-92); see also Laurence M. Ulrich, Comment,
Wisconsin Recovery Limit for Victims of Municipal Torts: A Conflict of Public Interests, 1986
[Vol. 77:610
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day notice of claim provision.' 9 The legislature has since amended and
renumbered section 331.43 as section 893.80.50
M. WISCONSIN STATUTES SECrION 893.80
Subsections 893.80(1)(a) and (b) of the Wisconsin Statutes compose
the heart of the present municipal notice of claim statute.5 1 Subsection
(a) deals primarily with the filing time requirements of notice, while sub-
section (b) concomitantly deals with the content requirements of notice.
Distinguishing between these two requirements is especially significant
in the area of substantial compliance.52
Under subsection (a), "no action may be brought or maintained
against any... governmental subdivision" unless a written and signed
notice of the "circumstances of the claim" is served on the subdivision
within 120 days after the event giving rise to the claim.53 "Failure to give
the requisite notice shall not bar action on the claim if the... subdivision
... had actual notice of the claim and the claimant shows.., that the
delay or failure to give the requisite notice has not been prejudicial to
the defendant."54 Whether actual notice must be received within 120
days is subject to dispute and will be discussed later in this Comment.
Subsection (b) requires the claimant to submit a claim containing his
or her address and "an itemized statement of the relief sought. '55 The
statute imposes no time limit for the filing of the itemized statement of
relief.56 Hence, the claimant may separately file the written notice of the
Wis. L. RFv. 155. Punitive damages were not recoverable under the original statute; nor are
they recoverable under the present statute. See Wis. STAT. § 331.43(2) (1963); Wis. STAT.
§ 893.80(3) (1991-92); see also James D. Ghiardi, Punitive Damages in Wisconsin, 60 MARO. L.
REv. 753 (1977).
49. Wis. STAT. § 331.43(1) (1963). The original bill contained a 30 day notice of claim
provision. This time period, however, was rejected in favor of the more equitable 120 day
provision.
50. 1979 Wis. Laws ch. 323, § 29.
51. Wis. STAT. § 893.80 (1991-92).
52. The failure to make this distinction results in much confusion by counsel. See, e.g.,
Renner v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 151 Wis. 2d 885, 889, 447 N.W.2d 97, 98-99 (Ct. App. 1989).
53. Wis. STAT. § 893.80(1)(a) (1991-92). This time limit is statutorily extended under two
circumstances. With respect to a claim to recover damages for medical malpractice, the time
period is extended to 180 days after the discovery of the injury or the date on which the injury
should have been discovered. Id. § 893.80(lm). With respect to a claim for negligent inspec-
tion of property, the time limit is extended to one year after the discovery of the negligent act
or omission. Id. § 893.80(lp).
54. Id. § 893.80(1)(a).
55. Id. § 893.80(1)(b).
56. Figgs v. City of Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 2d 44, 50,357 N.W.2d 548, 552 (1984), rev'g 116
Wis. 2d 281, 342 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. App.). However, subsection (b) obviously has some time
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circumstances of the claim required under subsection (a) and the item-
ized statement of relief required under subsection (b).57 However, it is
equally appropriate for the plaintiff to fie a single document, within 120
days, containing both elements of information.58
Although subsection (b) requires an itemized statement of "relief," it
does not require an itemized statement of "damages."' 9 The only time
that a claimant must provide an item-by-item list is when more than one
type of "relief" is sought.60 Because damages are merely one type of
relief, plaintiffs are not required to itemize their damages; a damage
claim only need set forth a specific dollar amount.61 For example, if the
plaintiff is seeking damages and specific performance on a contract, the
plaintiff must itemize the two forms of relief. However, if the plaintiff is
seeking only damages, the plaintiff may combine the total amount of
damages and state them as one lump sum.62
In addition to specifying the content requirements of notice, section
893.80(1)(b) operates as an exhaustion requirement.63 Before commenc-
ing an action against a municipality, a plaintiff must wait until his or her
claim, containing an itemized statement of the relief sought, is disal-
limitation. The supreme court has held that "if the claim has not been filed and rejected at the
time the issue is raised in the suit, which is commenced before the filing and rejection of the
claim, the action shall be dismissed." Schwartz v. City of Milwaukee, 43 Wis. 2d 119, 128, 168
N.W.2d 107, 111 (1969).
57. Figgs, 121 Wis. 2d at 50, 357 N.W.2d at 552. The court explained:
Counsel may, by the circumstances of the injury, be unable to state any monetary claim
for relief within one hundred twenty days. Hence, in such cases, the written "notice of
circumstances" will be filed initially, and the statement of the claim containing an
'itemized statement of the relief sought' will come later.
Id. at 50 n.5, 357 N.W.2d at 552 n.5.
58. Id. at 50, 357 N.W.2d at 552; Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 308 N.W.2d 403,
408 (1981).
59. Figgs, 121 Wis. 2d at 49, 357 N.W.2d at 551. The terms "relief" and "damages" are
not synonymous. See id.
60. Id at 53, 357 N.W.2d at 553.
61. Gutter, 103 Wis. 2d at 9, 308 N.W.2d at 407.
62. "Separate amounts for pain and suffering, lost wages, medical bills, and future or per-
manent disability are claims for special damages. They are not different types of relief. They
all seek the relief of damages." Id. Therefore, they could all be combined and set forth as one
lump sum.
63. Subsection (b) has been characterized as containing an exhaustion requirement be-
cause it forces claimants to seek satisfaction from the governmental defendant before com-
mencing a cause of action. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 142 (1988) (discussing the
"exhaustion requirement" of § 893.80(1)(b)). The theory is that the governmental defendant
will investigate the claim and attempt to settle if it is found to have merit. I&.
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lowed.64 If the municipality expressly disallows the claim within 120
days of receiving it, the municipality earns the benefit of a six-month
statute of limitations, which runs from the date of disallowance.65 On
the other hand, if the municipality fails to expressly disallow within 120
days, the plaintiff's claim is automatically disallowed, and the six-month
abbreviated statute of limitations does not apply.66 Instead, the statute
of limitations for the underlying action applies. For example, if the un-
derlying action was one for personal injury, the three-year statute of lim-
itations for personal injury actions would apply.67
A. Pleading Noncompliance
The notice requirements of section 893.80(1) operate as a condition
precedent to recovery in all actions brought against governmental enti-
ties or officers.68 Noncompliance with the notice requirements is an af-
firmative defense,69 which must be pled by the municipal defendant.70
While the plaintiff has the burden of proving compliance with the notice
requirements of subsections (a) and (b), the plaintiff is not required to
allege compliance in the complaint.71
64. Although an action commenced before disallowance is considered "defective," the
claimant may refile the action after disallowance and dismissal of the defective action. Fox v.
City of Milwaukee, 159 Wis. 2d 581,464 N.W.2d 845 (Ct. App. 1990). If the action was other-
wise timely, the statute of limitations is tolled. Id.
65. Wis. STAT. § 893.80(1)(b) (1991-92).
66. See Linstrom v. Christianson, 161 Wis. 2d 635,469 N.W.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting
that where the municipality does not serve notice of disallowance of claim, the six month
limitation on bringing action is not triggered).
67. See Schwetz v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 126 Wis. 2d 32,36,374 N.W.2d 241,243 (Ct.
App. 1985); see also Jasenczak v. Schill, 55 Wis. 2d 378,385, 198 N.W.2d 369,372 (1972). The
statute of limitations for personal injury actions is Wis. STAT. § 893.54 (1991-92).
68. Sambs v. Nowak, 47 Wis. 2d 158, 167, 177 N.W.2d 144, 149 (1970). Stated differently,
compliance with § 893.80 is a "condition in fact requisite to liability." Majerus v. Milwaukee
County, 39 Wis. 2d 311, 317, 159 N.W.2d 86, 88 (1968).
69. Felder v. Casey, 139 Wis. 2d 614, 618, 408 N.W.2d 19, 21 (1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 487 U.S. 131 (1988). Although lack of notice is a complete defense, a claimant's
failure to comply with § 893.80 does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Figgs
v. City of Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 2d 44, 51 n.6, 357 N.W.2d 548, 552 n.6 (1984) (citing Lees v.
ILHR Dep't, 49 Wis. 2d 491, 497, 182 N.W.2d 245, 248-49 (1971)). The significance of this is
that noncompliance with the statute does not render an assertion of estoppel unavailable to
the plaintiff.
70. Weiss v. City of Milwaukee, 79 Wis. 2d 213, 228, 255 N.W.2d 496, 501 (1977) (citing
Rabe v. Outagamie County, 72 Wis. 2d 492, 498, 241 N.W.2d 428 (1976)).
71. Id.
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B. Scope and Coverage of the Statute
Although Wisconsin's notice of claim statute was previously limited
to tort actions,7 2 the current version, by virtue of the language "no ac-
tion," applies to all claims against a municipality, including claims for
equitable relief.7" However, the United States Supreme Court has held
that the notice requirements are preempted when federal civil rights ac-
tions are brought in state court.74
As in its scope, the notice of claim statute is quite broad in its cover-
age. The statute expressly states that it applies to claims against all gov-
ernmental bodies, political corporations, governmental subdivisions, and
their agents and employees.75 Falling within one or more of these cate-
gories are municipalities, counties, cities, villages, towns, school districts,
sewer districts, and all other political subdivisions of the state.76
Prior to 1977, different areas of municipal liability, such as the high-
way defects statute,77 contained their own notice provisions. The differ-
ent provisions created a "procedural maze unique to each type of
governmental agency. '78  However, section 893.80 now embodies the
singular notice of claim procedure for suing all governmental entities
other than the state.79
C. Justifications and Purposes of the Statute
A critical examination of any statute necessitates inquiry into
whether its purposes justify its existence. Specifically, a notice of claim
statute demands inquiry into whether its purposes justify segregation of
the governmental unit into a privileged class of defendants, even at the
72. See Wis. STAT. § 895.43 (1975).
73. State v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 181,515 N.W.2d 888, 890 (1994), overrul-
ing Nicolet v. Village of Fox Point, 177 Wis. 2d 80, 501 N.W.2d 842 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that statute does not apply to claims for equitable relief); Harkness v. Palmyra-Eagle Sch.
Dist., 157 Wis. 2d 567, 460 N.W.2d 769 (Ct. App. 1990) (same); Kaiser v. City of Mauston, 99
Wis. 2d 345, 299 N.W.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1980) (same).
The time limit for providing notice is extended for two types of actions: medical malprac-
tice actions under § 893.80(lm) and negligent inspection of property actions under
§ 893.80(lp). See supra note 53.
74. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 143 (1988) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
75. Wis. STAT. § 893.80(1)(a) (1991-92).
76. See id. § 345.01(1)(c).
77. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 81.15 (1982). This section is now incorporated by reference into
Wis. STAT. § 893.80 (1991-92).
78. See Rabe v. Outagamie County, 72 Wis. 2d 492, 501, 241 N.W.2d 428, 433 (1976).
79. The procedural requirements for suing the State of Wisconsin are found in Wis. STAT.
§ 893.82 (1991-92). The notice provisions are more rigid under the State notice of claim stat-
ute than under the municipal notice of claim statute.
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cost of excluding some valid claims from adjudication. Wisconsin courts
have traditionally attached different purposes to notice statutes depend-
ing on whether the particular statute is a "notice of injury" or a "notice
of claim" statute.8" However, this distinction has become meaningless in
relation to section 893.80 of the Wisconsin Statutes. Wisconsin courts
disagree about whether the statute is a notice of injury or a notice of
claim statute.81 As borne out by this divergence among the courts, sec-
tion 893.80 evidently serves the purposes of both types of statutes. 82 Ac-
cordingly, although this writer and others refer to the statute as a notice
of claim statute,83 it is in fact both a notice of claim and a notice of injury
statute. Specifically, subsection (a) of the statute serves the traditional
function of a notice of injury statute, and subsection (b) serves the tradi-
tional function of a notice of claim statute.' 4 As such, each subsection of
the statute has one primary and one secondary purpose.85
80. The principal purpose of a notice of injury statute is to enable municipal officers to
investigate the matter, whereas the principal purpose of a notice of claim statute is "to afford
the municipality an opportunity to effect a compromise without suit." See Colburn v. Ozau-
kee County, 39 Wis. 2d 231,239, 159 N.W.2d 33,36 (1968); Pattermann v. City of Whitewater,
32 Wis. 2d 350, 357, 145 N.W.2d 705,708 (1966); Van v. Town of Manitowoc Rapids, 150 Wis.
2d 929, 933, 442 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Ct. App. 1989).
81. The following cases have either expressly characterized Wis. STAT. § 893.80 (1991-92),
or its predecessor, as a notice of injury statute or have assigned to the statute the traditional
purpose of a notice of injury statute: Nielsen v. Town of Silver Cliff, 112 Vis. 2d 574, 580, 334
N.W.2d 242,245 (1983) (assigning purpose of notice of injury statute); Pattermann, 32 Wis. 2d
at 358, 145 N.W.2d at 709 (characterizing as notice of injury statute); Van, 150 Wis. 2d at 933,
442 N.W.2d at 559 (characterizing as notice of injury statute); Elkhorn Area Sch. Dist. v. East
Troy Community Sch. Dist., 110 Wis. 2d 1, 5,327 N.W.2d 206,208 (Ct. App. 1982) (character-
izing as notice of injury statute).
The following cases have either expressly characterized Wis. STAT. § 893.80 (1991-92), or
its predecessor, as a notice of claim statute or have assigned to the statute the traditional
purpose of a notice of claim statute: Felder v. Casey, 139 Wis. 2d 614, 624, 408 N.W.2d 19, 23
(1987) (characterizing as notice of claim), rev'd on other grounds, 487 U.S. 131 (1988); Eggs v.
City of Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 2d 44, 53, 357 N.W.2d 548, 553 (1984) (assigning purpose of
notice of claim statute); Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 308 N.W.2d 403, 407 (1981)
(assigning purpose of notice of claim statute).
82. See Smith v. Milwaukee County, 149 Wis. 2d 934, 937-38, 440 N.W.2d 360, 361-62
(1989) (stating that § 893.80 (serves both purposes).
83. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 143 (1988).
84. This conclusion is buttressed by the traditional purposes assigned to each type of stat-
ute. Accord Figgs, 121 Wis. 2d at 53,357 N.W.2d at 553; Gutter, 103 Wis. 2d at 9,308 N.W.2d
at 407; Elkhorn, 110 Wis. 2d at 5, 327 N.W.2d at 208; Nielsen, 112 Wis. 2d at 580, 334 N.W.2d
at 245. Contra Pattermann, 32 Wis. 2d at 358, 145 N.W.2d at 709 (stating that statute does not
serve dual function); Gonzalez v. Tesky, 160 Wis. 2d 1, 6,465 N.W.2d 525,527 (Ct. App. 1990)
(stating that subsection (b) is notice of injury statute).
85. Notice of claim statutes in most jurisdictions are justified on the same four basic pur-
poses. See Gordon, supra note 8, at 423-24; Comment, Notice of Claim Requirement Under the
Minnesota Municipal Tort Liability Act, 4 WM. MrrcHELL L. Rnv. 93, 96 (1978).
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The primary purpose of notice under subsection (a) is to provide gov-
ernmental authorities with an opportunity to make a prompt investiga-
tion of the circumstances giving rise to the claim.86 The reasoning is that
fraudulent and specious claims will more readily be detected when the
facts are fresh, the witnesses are available, and the conditions have not
materially changed.s7 This purpose, however, would seem to be equally
applicable to a suit by one private individual against another. Moreover,
empirical studies have indicated that municipalities likely receive more
efficient legal services than the average plaintiff88 and, therefore, do not
need special treatment to prepare a strong defense. Hence, the "prompt
investigation" purpose alone arguably does not justify segregation of the
governmental unit into a privileged class.
A secondary purpose of subsection (a) is to alert municipalities of
dangerous conditions or inappropriate and unlawful governmental con-
duct.89 This allows the municipality to take prompt corrective measures
and thereby prevent similar accidents from occurring in the future.90
The reasoning is that, unlike an individual, a municipality is often una-
ware of its tortious activity and, therefore, needs the added protection of
a notice statute in order to avoid incurring multiple losses caused by one
defective condition or a singular practice of unlawful conduct.91
Although this reasoning is compelling, it alone cannot support the
existence of the notice of claim statute. First, while it is true that the
governing body of a municipality might be unaware of its agent's torts,
the same can be said for any private corporation that cannot continu-
ously watch all of its agents. Similarly, an individual might be unaware
of a dangerous condition on his or her property. Second, only two Wis-
consin cases have even mentioned that the statute serves to prevent simi-
lar accidents in the future, and those cases considered such a purpose to
be merely an ancillary benefit of the statute rather than one of its gen-
86. Pattermann, 32 Wis. 2d at 353, 145 N.W.2d at 708-9; Elkhorn 110 Wis. 2d at 5, 327
N.W.2d at 208; Nielsen, 112 Wis. 2d at 580, 334 N.W.2d at 245.
87. See Nielsen, 112 Wis. 2d at 580, 334 N.W.2d at 245; 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corpo-
rations § 686 (Supp. 1993).
88. Fuller & Casner, supra note 16, at 446. Public attorneys rapidly become specialists in
their field and often possess the principal facts necessary to defend an action even before the
claimant has consulted with a lawyer. Id. Although these studies were done to determine the
validity of the fears used to justify maintaining governmental immunity, the same reasoning
applies here.
89. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 143 (1988) (stating that although the Wisconsin Notice
of Claim Statute allows a municipality to take prompt corrective action, that function is not a
primary purpose of the statute).
90. Nielsen, 112 Wis. 2d at 580, 334 N.W.2d at 245.
91. See Sahm, supra note 36, at 3.
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eral or primary purposes." The legislature surely did not intend that a
mere ancillary benefit serve as the justification for placing municipal
tort-feasors into a privileged class.93 Moreover, when a municipality is
subject to complete liability for its torts, "[p]ublic safety becomes a mat-
ter of real concern... repair programs are stimulated... [and] safety
education for... officers and the general public is likely to result. With-
out laboring the point, it seems clear that such results are highly
desirable." 94
The primary purpose of subsection (b) of the statute "is to give the
municipality the opportunity to attempt to compromise the claim and
effect settlement before the parties are forced to proceed with a lengthy
or costly lawsuit." 95 The supreme court has elaborated on this point as
follows:
Statutory... provisions requiring presentation of claims or de-
mands to the governing body of the municipal corporation before
an action is instituted are in furtherance of a public policy to pre-
vent needless litigation and to save unnecessary expenses and
costs by affording an opportunity amicably to adjust all claims
against municipal corporations before suit is brought.
96
Thus, similar to the reasoning behind subsection (a), the underlying ra-
tionale of subsection (b) appears to be that prompt notice enables mu-
nicipalities to more easily and accurately ascertain the facts.9 7 The
municipality is thus in a better position to determine whether liability
exists. If it determines that liability exists, the municipality can settle
and avoid needless litigation. On the other hand, if it determines that no
liability exists, or if the plaintiff is unable to procure a satisfactory settle-
92. "Thorough investigations guard against specious claims and may help prevent similar
accidents in the future." Nielsen, 112 Wis. 2d at 580, 334 N.W.2d at 245 (citing Rabe v.
Outagamie County, 72 Wis. 2d 492, 497, 241 N.W.2d 428 (1976)).
93. One commentator has argued that notice of claim statutes are generally motivated by
concern for the public purse, and not for public safety. See Gordon, supra note 8, at 423. This
appears to be the case in Wisconsin.
94. Fuller & Casner, supra note 16, at 460.
95. Felder v. Casey, 139 Wis. 2d 614,624,408 N.W.2d 19,23-24 (1987) (citing Pattermann
v. City of Whitewater, 32 Wis. 2d 350, 357, 145 N.W.2d 705, 709 (1966)), rev'd, 487 U.S. 131
(1988). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has on one occasion stated that "[t]here is nothing in
sec. 893.80, Stats., to suggest that the legislature intended any different or additional purpose
for this particular notice-of-claim statute." Figgs v. City of Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 2d 44, 53-54,
357 N.W.2d 548, 553 (1984).
96. Felder, 139 Wis. 2d at 624, 408 N.W.2d at 24 (citations omitted).
97. Members of the Supreme Court have expressed that notice enables officials to investi-
gate claims in a timely fashion, thereby making it easier to ascertain the facts accurately and to
settle meritorious claims without litigation. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 142 (1988); see also
56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations § 686 (Supp. 1993).
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ment, the statute assures prompt initiation of litigation, which inures to
the benefit of both the plaintiff and the municipal defendant.
Although municipalities should be given an opportunity to avoid ex-
pensive litigation, this purpose does not justify placing governmental de-
fendants in a privileged class. Again, this reasoning seems to be equally
applicable to a suit by one private individual against another. Further-
more, the statute is not benefitting the plaintiff in any way that the plain-
tiff would not be benefitted in its absence.98 Thus, the "settlement and
compromise" purpose of the statute is also singularly without force as a
justification for the statute.
A secondary purpose of subsection (b) is to alert municipalities of
"possible expenses so that appropriate review of the budget can be
made."99 Consistent with this purpose, Wisconsin courts have empha-
sized that notice under section 893.80 must state the amount of damages
the plaintiff seeks'00 and an intent to hold the governing body responsi-
ble for those damages.' 0' However, the budgetary planning purpose has
rarely been mentioned by the courts. In fact, the supreme court, which
has on numerous occasions enunciated the purposes of the statute, has
never mentioned that the statute serves a budgetary planning purpose.
Like the other purposes previously discussed, review of the budget
would seem equally applicable to a suit by one private individual against
another. 02 Although private defendants generally have less exposure in
terms of the number of claims filed against them, municipal defendants
generally have deeper pockets. Moreover, the liability of municipal de-
fendants is statutorily limited, 0 3 whereas the liability of private defend-
ants is not. Providing municipalities with time to review their budgets
98. Regarding Wisconsin's notice of claim statute, the United States Supreme Court has
stated that "such statutes 'are enacted primarily for the benefit of governmental defendants,'
and are intended to afford such defendants an opportunity to prepare a stronger case." Felder,
487 U.S. at 145 (citations omitted).
99. Van v. Town of Manitowoc Rapids, 150 Wis. 2d 929, 933, 442 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Ct.
App. 1989) (citing Elm Park Iowa, Inc. v. Denniston, 92 Wis. 2d 723, 730, 286 N.W.2d 5, 8-9
(Ct. App. 1979)).
100. See Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 308 N.W. 2d 403, 407 (1981) (stating that
the statute's purpose cannot be served unless the claim demands a specific sum of money).
101. See Felder v. Casey, 139 Wis. 2d 614, 630, 408 N.W.2d 19, 26 (1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
102. The California Supreme Court has suggested that the "budget review" purpose was
more compelling in the "early days [when] towns were small and such expenditures were
important items in a limited budget." Note, supra note 36, at 87 (quoting Cresent Wharf &
Warehouse Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 278 P. 1028, 1030 (Cal. 1929).
103. See Wis. STAT. § 893.80(3) (1991-92).
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hardly seems to justify the existence of a statute that occasionally ex-
cludes valid claims.
D. The Insurance Crunch
As discussed earlier, local governments have always feared the ex-
pansion of municipal liability.1°4 In the mid-to-late 1980s, a virtually
nonexistent insurance market exacerbated this fear.10 5 Insurance com-
panies claimed that the rapid expansion of municipal liability made the
municipal insurance market unpredictable and, consequently, difficult to
underwrite. 10 6 As a result, even when insurance was technically avail-
able, high insurance premiums often made coverage cost prohibitive. 07
Across the nation, many municipalities, teetering on the verge of in-
solvency, urged their legislatures to pass laws reducing municipal liability
and ensuring that municipalities could obtain coverage for such liabil-
ity.- 0 Hence, any attempt to remove an existing barrier to municipal
liability, such as a municipal notice of claim statute, is likely to meet with
staunch opposition from both the insurance industry and municipalities.
The insurance industry will argue that the mere threat of expanding
municipal liability will further decrease the predictability of the market
and, thus, the availability of insurance.10 9 Municipalities will argue that
the removal of existing barriers will increase their liability exposure,
completely eliminate the availability of insurance, and render municipal-
ities insolvent, resulting in empty coffers to pay even the most deserving
claims.
However, these fears cannot support the existence of Wisconsin's
municipal notice of claim statute. Maintaining the statute will not solve
the recurring insurance dilemma. Indeed, the statute was in place when
the insurance crunch reached its apex in the late 1980s. Whether elimi-
nating parts of the statute will decrease the availability of insurance is
subject to debate." 0 For example, if Wisconsin courts interpret an ex-
104. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
105. Nancy Blodgett, Premium Hikes Stun Municipalities, 72 A.B.A. J., July 1986, at 48.
106. Id at 49.
107. See James R. Hackney, Jr., A Proposal for State Funding of Municipal Tort Liability,
98 YALE LJ. 389, 390 n.4 (1988); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem
Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, nn.9-12 (1987); see also Richland, Municipal Law: Local Gov-
ernment Liability and Tort Reform, N.Y.LJ. May 22, 1986, at 1 (discussing dramatic increases,
ranging from 100% to 400%, in municipal insurance premiums).
108. Hackney, supra note 107, at 389.
109. See Blodgett, supra note 105, at 51.
110. Arguably, a notice of claim statute might help stabilize the insurance market by de-
lineating the scope of governmental liability. However, if the statute is applied on a case-by-
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ception to the general rule of section 893.80 so broadly that the excep-
tion swallows the rule, then the rule will rarely bar recovery and any
increase in liability resulting from the abolition of the rule will be de
minimis. As discussed later, Wisconsin courts arguably have permitted
the actual notice exception to swallow the written notice rule.
In any event, arguments concerning the statute's effect on either the
insurance market or the coffers of municipalities are unpersuasive. Such
arguments harken back to the rationale in Russell v. Men of Devon,111
where the court, fearing an infinity of actions and recognizing that the
County of Devon had no funds with which to pay the plaintiff, extended
immunity to the county. As previously discussed, the rationale in Russell
has "been shot to death on so many different battlefields that it would
seem utter folly now to resurrect it. 1" 2 The Russell rationale is incapa-
ble of supporting immunity in any form. The legislature certainly would
not reinstate governmental immunity to encourage insurance companies
to underwrite. Thus, why would the legislature maintain inequitable no-
tice provisions, which have the same effect and are supported by the
same justifications as governmental immunity, just to encourage insur-
ance companies to underwrite municipal claims policies?
Arguably, some middle ground between complete and zero immunity
is necessary to prevent unlimited municipal liability and widespread mu-
nicipal insolvency. In Wisconsin, this middle ground is largely secured
by section 893.80(3) of the Wisconsin Statutes, which limits an individual
plaintiff's recovery to $50,000.1 3 This middle ground can be further se-
cured by means that do not produce the harsh results associated with the
notice of claim statue. For instance, many municipalities currently cope
with the insurance dilemma either by self insuring or by pooling funds
with other municipalities and entering into a mutual insurance
agreement." 4
case basis, the outcome will be fairly unpredictable and, thus, the scope of liability uncertain.
The actual notice without prejudice provision in § 893.80 mandates a case-by-case application
of the statute. Thus, the notice provisions in § 893.80 probably do not help delineate the scope
of governmental liability in Wisconsin.
111. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
112. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26,33-34, 115 N.W.2d 618,622 (1962) (quot-
ing Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 126 N.E. 72,77 (Ohio 1919) (Wanamaker, J., concurring)); see
also supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
113. Wis. STAT. § 893.80(3) (1991-92); see also supra note 48.
114. See Blodgett, supra note 105, at 48-50. Such solutions generally advance the equita-
ble notion of spreading losses rather than imposing them on individual plaintiffs. For exam-
ple, one commentator has proposed that states should bear the bulk of traditional municipal
tort liability. Hackney, supra note 107, at 389. The state could finance the obligation through
a system of progressive taxation and through the imposition of fines against municipalities,
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IV. MITIGATING THE "HARSH CONSEQUENCES" OF THE STATUTE
In recent years, Wisconsin courts have expressed their disapproval of
notice of claim statutes.
We do not enthusiastically endorse the result in this case. The
requirements of sec. 893.80(1)(a), Stats., produce harsh conse-
quences. Nonetheless, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted
about another notice of injury provision, "the terms of this legis-
lative enactment must be applied in accord with their plain mean-
ing, and we are not free to ignore their import." We join the
court in recognizing that although the goals sought to be achieved
by notice of injury statutes are not improper, the legislature might
achieve its objectives by less drastic means.'15
The legislature has not responded to these criticisms. As a result, Wis-
consin courts have struggled to adhere to the mandate of the statute
without allowing inequitable results to flow from its technical require-
ments. Pursuant to this goal, Wisconsin courts have occasionally applied
the doctrine of substantial compliance and have broadly construed the
statute's actual notice exception.
A. Substantial Compliance
The most common means employed by other state courts to alleviate
the harsh effects of their notice of claim statutes is application of the
doctrine of substantial compliance. 16 Although this application gener-
ally has been effective, it also has tended, because of its fact-intensive
nature, to be unpredictable. Moreover, while courts have freely applied
this doctrine to the content requirements of notice statutes, it has been
applied far more sparingly to the rigid time requirements of the stat-
utes." 7 Wisconsin's application of the doctrine is illustrative.
which would operate to deter municipalities from engaging in harmful practices in the future.
Id. at 397. By so doing, states could take advantage of low insurance rates when available and
self-insure when premiums are high or insurance is unavailable. I&. at 399 n.41. In addition,
because states have a larger base from which to draw their tax revenues, state funding of
municipal liability would more equitably spread the loss from richer municipalities to poorer
municipalities. Id. at 397.
115. Elkhorn Area Sch. Dist. v. East Toy Community Sch. Dist., 110 Wis. 2d 1, 6-7, 327
N.W.2d 206, 209 (Ct. App. 1982) (citing Mannino v. Davenport, 99 Wis. 2d 602, 615-16, 299
N.W.2d 823, 829 (1981)) (citation omitted).
116. See, e.g., Galbreath v. Indianapolis, 255 N.E.2d 225 (Ind. 1970); West Omaha Inv. v.
Sanitary & Imp. Dist. No. 48 of Sarpy County, 420 N.W.2d 291 (Neb. 1988); Sandak v. Tuxedo
Union Sch. Dist., 124 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y. 1954); Miles v. City of Richmond, 373 S.E.2d 715 (Va.
1988); see also 18 McQuILLIN, supra note 37, § 53.153.
117. "In one respect, courts are.., quite strict in requiring compliance with notice re-
quirements: the notice must be given within the time specified by the relevant legislation;
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In 1913, the Wisconsin Supreme Court first applied the doctrine of
substantial compliance to a notice of claim statute." 8 Since then, the
supreme court has developed a clearly established policy of substantial
compliance with regard to the content requirements of notice found in
section 893.80(1)(b) of the Wisconsin Statutes. To determine whether a
plaintiff's cause of action is saved by substantial compliance, the
supreme court uses the following guidelines:
(1) [T]he statement of the demand must be definite enough to
fulfill the purpose of the claim statute; and
(2) ... "[a] construction which preserves a bona fide claim so that
it may be passed upon by a competent tribunal is to be preferred
to a construction which cuts it off without a trial." 119
Notwithstanding the court's ostensibly plaintiff-friendly stance, plaintiffs
should exercise care to strictly comply with the requirements of the stat-
ute. As the following cases demonstrate, the parameters of substantial
compliance in Wisconsin are not fully defined. 2 °
The Wisconsin notice of claim statute requires a plaintiff to present
an "itemized statement of the relief sought.'' -2 This requirement has
long been interpreted to mean that when a plaintiff is seeking damages a
dollar amount must be stated.12 While substantial compliance with the
requirement is sufficient, what constitutes substantial compliance is less
definite. Clearly, if no dollar amount is stated, there is no substantial
filing even one day late will bar a claim." OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW, LIABILrrY IN TORT § 195, at 701 (1982).
118. See Moyer v. City of Oshkosh, 151 Wis. 586, 593, 139 N.W. 378, 381 (1913).
119. Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 10-11, 308 N.W.2d 403, 408 (1981) (quoting
Moyer, 151 Wis. at 593, 139 N.W. at 380 (1913)).
120. At least one legal scholar has sharply criticized the courts' application of substantial
compliance to notice of claim statutes.
To permit any departure from its plain terms is to introduce into it an element of uncer-
tainty, and to open the way for a complete breaking down and nullification of the
statute; and instead of having a uniform interpretation applicable to all cases, there will
be no settled rule. As a consequence, the courts will be called upon, over and over
again, to determine whether upon the facts in each particular case the statute has been
substantially complied with, or its spirit and purpose subserved, thus leading to endless
confusion.
Sahm, supra note 36, at 10.
121. See Wis. STAT. § 893.80(1)(b) (1991-92).
122. "Implicit in the requirements of... [notice of claim statutes] is that the amount of the
claim be stated in dollars and cents, because without this it would be impossible for the [munic-
ipality] to properly allow the claim." Pattermann v. City of Whitewater, 32 Wis. 2d 350, 358,
145 N.W.2d 705, 709 (1966) (quoting Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Washburn County, 2 Wis. 2d 214,
226, 85 N.W.2d 840, 846 (1957)) (emphasis added).
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compliance." z Likewise, a notice of claim stating that "damages [will]
not exceed the $25,000 statutory limitation" fails to satisfy the require-
ment.1 24 The supreme court also has held that a claim stating that the
"claimant has been damaged in excess of Twenty-five Thousand
($25,000) Dollars" fails to substantially comply with the requirement. 25
Conversely, the supreme court has held that a notice of claim stating
a demand in excess of the statutory damage limitation126 does substan-
tially comply with the requirement. 27 The court also has held that a
notice of claim stating that "[o]ur demand at this time is $25,000" satisfies
the notice requirement.'2 Thus, although the courts are willing to per-
mit substantial compliance with the "itemized statement of relief" re-
quirement, the scope of the doctrine is quite narrow in its application.
Hence, when seeking monetary damages, the wise practitioner will
strictly comply with the requirement by demanding a specific dollar
amount.
Wisconsin's notice of claim statute also requires a plaintiff to include
his or her address in the notice of claim.' 29 Substantial compliance with
this requirement is also sufficient. In Novak v. City of Delavan,3 ° the
plaintiffs' causes of action hinged upon whether filing a notice of claim
with their attorney's address constituted substantial compliance with the
statutory requirement that a notice of claim contain the claimant's ad-
dress.' 3 ' The court held that the plaintiffs "reasonably" complied with
the statute, stating that "the policy of this court [is] to preserve a bona
fide claim where there has been substantial compliance with a statute
requiring notice. "132
123. "It is difficult to see how [a] notice of claim ... could give the city an opportunity to
compromise when the amount of the claim was not stated." Sambs v. Nowak, 47 Wis. 2d 158,
166, 177 N.W.2d 144, 148 (1970).
124. See Pattermann, 32 Wis. 2d at 358, 145 N.W.2d at 709. Similarly, a notice of claim
stating that damages "to" the amount of fifty thousand dollars for one plaintiff, and "up to"
fifteen thousand dollars for the other plaintiff does not satisfy the requirement. See Colburn v.
Ozaukee County, 39 Vis. 2d 231, 237-38, 159 N.W.2d 331 (1968).
125. Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 308 N.W.2d 403, 408 (1981).
126. See Wis. STAT. § 893.80(3) (1991-92).
127. See Schwartz v. City of Milwaukee, 43 Wis. 2d 119, 124, 168 N.W.2d 107, 109-10
(1969).
128. See Gutter, 103 Wis. 2d at 5, 11,308 N.W.2d at 405,408 (emphasis added). However,
the court dramatically tempered its holding by stating "we recommend that hereafter counsel
not use any ambiguous phrasing in setting forth the sum demanded if counsel wish the de-
mand to be viewed as a claim which complies with the statute." Id at 11, 308 N.W.2d at 408.
129. See Wis. STAT. § 893.80(1)(b) (1991-92).
130. 31 Wis. 2d 200, 143 N.W.2d 6 (1966).
131. See Wis. STAT. § 62.25 (1)(c) (1959).
132. Novak, 31 Wis. 2d at 211, 143 N.W.2d at 12.
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TWo requirements of section 893.80(1)(b) are not satisfied by sub-
stantial compliance: (1) disallowance and (2) commencement of an ac-
tion.1 33 For example, in Schwetz v. Employers Insurance of Wausau,13
the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed. twice for failing to strictly comply
with these requirements-once for commencing their action before their
claims were disallowed and, upon refiling their claims, a second time for
failing to commence their action within the three year statute of limita-
tions.135 The supreme court has held that requirements concerning the
act of filing, such as the 120-day notice requirement, are to be distin-
guished from those concerning the contents of the document after it is
filed. 136 Substantial compliance may, if the facts warrant, satisfy the lat-
ter, but not the former.1 37
Consistent with this distinction, Wisconsin courts have not overtly ap-
plied the doctrine of substantial compliance to the 120-day notice re-
quirement under section 893.80(1)(a). As discussed later in this
Comment, the legislature has written an "actual notice" exception into
the 120-day notice requirement. Plaintiffs have relied on this exception,
rather than on the doctrine of substantial compliance, to excuse untimely
notice. However, the state notice of claim statute,'3 8 the sister statute to
the municipal notice of claim statute, does not have an actual notice ex-
ception.139 Without this exception at their disposal, plaintiffs have ar-
133. See Rabe v. Outagamie County, 72 Wis. 2d 492, 501, 241 N.W.2d 428, 433 (1976);
Jasenczak v. Schill, 55 Wis. 2d 378, 198 N.W.2d 369 (1972); Schwetz v. Employers Ins. of
Wausau, 126 Wis. 2d 32, 34, 374 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Ct. App. 1985).
134. 126 Wis. 2d 32, 374 N.W.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1985).
135. Id at 33-34, 374 N.W.2d at 242-43.
136. See Rabe, 72 Wis. 2d at 501, 241 N.W.2d at 433 (distinguishing Novak v. City of
Delavan, 31 Wis. 2d 200, 143 N.W.2d 6 (1966), and other cases summarized therein relating to
substantial compliance).
137. See Rabe, 72 Wis. 2d at 501, 241 N.W.2d at 433.
138. Wis. STAT. § 893.82(3) (1991-92) provides in pertinent part:
[N]o civil action or civil proceeding may be brought against any state officer, employee
or agent for or on account of any act growing out of or committed in the course of the
discharge of the officer's, employe's or agent's duties ... unless within 120 days of the
event causing the injury, damage or death giving rise to the civil action or civil proceed-
ing, the claimant in the action or proceeding serves upon the attorney general written
notice of a claim stating the time, date, location, and circumstances of the event giving
rise to the claim for the injury, damage or death and the names of persons involved,
including the name of the state officer, employe or agent involved. A specific denial by
the attorney general is not a condition precedent to bringing the civil action or civil
proceeding.
139. The rationale for not providing state tort victims with an actual notice exception has
not been articulated by the courts or the legislature.
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gued that substantial compliance satisfies the 120-day notice
requirement of the state notice of claim statute.
The courts have applied the doctrine of substantial compliance to the
content requirements of the state notice of claim statute in a manner that
is generally analogous to the application of that doctrine to the content
requirements of the municipal notice of claim statute.140 Accordingly, 14 1
the courts have uniformly held that substantial compliance with the filing
time under the state notice of claim statute is insufficient. 142
In Yotvat v. Roth, 4 3 the court of appeals held that under the state
notice statute, "[n]o exception is permitted. When the legislature has
intended otherwise in a comparable situation, it has expressly allowed an
exception to the time requirements in filing notice."'144 The comparable
situation to which the court refers is, of course, the municipal notice of
claim statute. 45
In Renner v. Madison General Hospital,'4 the plaintiff allegedly re-
ceived negligent medical treatment while giving birth to her daughter. 4 7
Unbeknownst to the plaintiff or her attorney, the defendant doctors
were employed by the University of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics,
thereby making them state employees, shielded by the notice provisions
of the state notice of claim statute.14  The plaintiff became aware that
the defendants were state employees by virtue of their motion to dismiss
140. Se4 e.g., Daily v. University of Wis., Whitewater, 145 Wis. 2d 756, 759-60, 429
N.W.2d 83, 84-85 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the failure to state the name of state employee
alleged to be negligent, as required by statute, is not fatal to the claim). Daily explicitly drew
its reasoning from cases dealing with the municipal notice of claims statute. Idi at 759, 429
N.W.2d at 85. Prior to Daily, the appellate court, relying on Yotvat v. Roth, 95 Wis. 2d 357,
290 N.W.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1980), had held that the failure to name medical personnel in the
notice of claim nullified the notice as to those defendants. See Protic v. Castle Co., 132 Wis. 2d
364, 369, 392 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Ct. App. 1986). However, in Daily, the court acknowledged
that its earlier reliance on Yotvat was misplaced. Daily, 145 Wis. 2d at 759, 429 N.W.2d at 84.
This misplaced reliance resulted because the court in Protic failed to distinguish between the
time requirements and the content requirements of notice. See supra notes 134-35 and accom-
panying text.
141. The courts' application is consistent with the supreme court's distinction between the
requirements concerning the act of filing and those concerning the contents of the document
after it is filed. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
142. See Renner v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 151 Wis. 2d 885, 889, 447 N.W.2d 97, 99 (Ct.
App. 1989); Yotvat, 95 Wis. 2d at 362, 290 N.W.2d at 527.
143. 95 Wis. 2d 357, 290 N.W.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1980).
144. Id at 361, 290 N.W.2d at 527.
145. Id
146. 151 Wis. 2d 885, 447 N.W.2d 97 (Ct. App. 1989).
147. Id. at 888, 447 N.W.2d at 98.
148. Id.
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and immediately filed a claim with the attorney general. 49 Although
cognizant of the plaintiff's hardship, the court expressly reaffirmed its
decision in Roth, holding that "substantial compliance with the filing
time under the State notice of claim statute is insufficient.' 15° The court
reasoned that "[a] liberal construction which would excuse the filing of
an untimely claim would not effect the legislative intent to provide the
attorney general with adequate time to investigate claims.' 5'
The purposes underlying the municipal notice of claim statute and
the state notice of claim statute are virtually identical.' 52 Hence, one
might cogently reason that if substantial compliance with the filing time
under the state notice of claim statute would defeat its purpose, then
substantial compliance with the filing time under the municipal notice of
claim statute would defeat its purpose as well. This reasoning is even
more compelling in light of the fact that the courts' first guiding principle
in invoking the doctrine of substantial compliance requires inquiry into
whether the plaintiff has complied "enough to fulfill the purpose of the
claim statute.'1 53
B. The Actual Notice Exception
To ameliorate some of the harsh consequences of the filing time re-
quirements in notice of claim statutes, some state legislatures have incor-
porated exceptions that resemble the doctrine of substantial compliance
into their notice of claim statutes. 54 Couched in terms of an "actual
notice" provision, Wisconsin's modern notice of claim statute has con-
tained such an exception since its inception in 1963.'55 Wisconsin courts
149. Id
150. Id at 889, 447 N.W.2d at 99.
151. Id
152. The legislature has expressly stated that the purposes of the State notice of claim
statute are to:
1. Provide the attorney general with adequate time to investigate claims which might
result in judgments to be paid by the state.
2. Provide the attorney general with an opportunity to effect a compromise without a
civil action or civil proceeding.
Wis. STAT. § 893.82(1)(a)(1991-92).
Likewise, "[t]he purpose of the 'notice of claim' statute, sec. 893.80, Stats. . . . is to afford
... governmental units an opportunity to investigate and amicably compromise claims without
litigation." Smith v. Milwaukee County, 149 Wis. 2d 934, 937-38, 440 N.W.2d 360, 361-62
(1989); see also supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
153. Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 10-11, 308 N.W.2d 403, 408 (1981).
154. See, e.g., MiN,. STAT. § 466.05 (Supp. 1990); N.J. REv. STAT. § 59:8-9 (1992); N.Y.
GEN. MUN. LAw § 50-e (McKinney Cum Supp. 1991); Tx. CODE ANN. § 41-4-16 (1992).
155. See Wis. STAT. § 331.43 (1963) (current version at Wis. STAT. § 893.80 (1991-92)).
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have generally used the actual notice exception to avoid injustice; how-
ever, the breadth of the exception has created inconsistent reasoning by
the courts and raised concerns about the legitimacy of the statute.
1. Defining "Actual Notice"
Wisconsin's municipal notice of claim statute provides that a claim-
ant's failure to furnish a written notice of claim within 120 days will not
bar action on the claim if the claimant demonstrates that the municipal-
ity had "actual notice" of the claim and was not prejudiced by the claim-
ant's failure to provide the requisite written notice. 156 Although the
statute is silent on what constitutes actual notice, "[d]ocuments which
have been held to constitute adequate [actual] notice have usually, at a
minimum, recited the facts giving rise to the injury and have indicated an
intent on the plaintiff's part to hold the city responsible for any damages
resulting from the injury.' 1 57 Because actual notice under the statute is
equivalent to actual knowledge that an injured party intends to pursue a
claim against the municipality,5 8 constructive notice is not sufficient to
satisfy the actual notice exception. 59 Thus, actual notice must meet the
same basic content requirements as formal written notice.
While not articulated in any reported Wisconsin decision, the ration-
ale behind insisting that actual notice inform the municipality of the in-
jured party's intent to hold the municipality responsible appears to be
that in the absence of such a requirement, municipalities would be com-
pelled to investigate every incident upon the assumption that it might
lead to litigation. 60 That result would place an onerous burden on mu-
nicipalities and would be contrary to the statute's general purpose of
156. Wis. STAT. § 893.80(1)(a) (1991-92). Whether a municipality had actual notice of the
plaintiff's claim presents a mixed question of fact and law. Olsen v. Township of Spooner, 133
Wis. 2d 371,377,395 N.W.2d 808,811 (Ct. App. 1986). What the municipality knew about the
claim is a factual finding that may not be overturned unless clearly erroneous; but, whether
that knowledge constituted actual notice under the law is a question of law. Ild.
157. Felder v. Casey, 139 Wis. 2d 614, 630, 408 N.W2d 19, 26 (1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
158. See Elkhorn Area Sch. Dist. v. East Troy Community Sch. Dist., 110 Wis. 2d 1, 5-6,
327 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Ct. App. 1982).
159. Id. at 6,327 N.W.2d at 209; Olsen, 133 Wis. 2d at 378,395 N.W.2d at 811. Even if the
municipality is able to hypothesize from its knowledge that an individual might have a claim
for damages, such knowledge does not satisfy the requirements of actual notice. Olsen, 133
Wis. 2d at 378, 395 N.W.2d at 811.
160. See Craney v. Pacetti, No. 90-CV-367 (Wis. Ct. App. Dist. II June 3, 1992). Employ-
ing similar reasoning, see Argenta v. City of Newton, 382 N.W.2d 457, 459-60 (Iowa 1986),
overruled by Miller v. Boone County Hosp., 394 N.W.2d 776 (Iowa 1986)). For a more liberal
interpretation of actual notice, see Kelly v. City of Rochester, 231 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1975).
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abrogating immunity under conditions designed to minimize governmen-
tal liability and the expenses associated with it.'61
On the other hand, requiring that actual notice indicate an intent to
hold the municipality liable has definite shortcomings. Controlled by
this requirement, Wisconsin's notice of claim statute precludes liability
irrespective of whether the municipality knew of the defective condition
or practice of illegal conduct. Even if the municipality immediately in-
vestigated the claim, corrected any defect, had ample opportunity to
compromise the claim, and was in no other way disadvantaged, the ac-
tual notice exception does not apply. The facts in Felder v. Casey 62 illus-
trate this point.
In Felder, the plaintiff alleged in his complaint against the City of
Milwaukee that several white police officers unlawfully "beat [him] with
batons, carried him to a paddy wagon while he was partially uncon-
scious, and threw him through the air and into the paddy wagon." '163
Felder did not dispute that he failed to give the standard written notice
under the statute, but contended that the following undisputed facts pro-
vided the city with actual notice within hours of his arrest: (1) a city
alderman was present at the scene of the arrest and contacted the police
chief, by letter, to personally inform him of the incident; (2) the city
police department completed the initial phase of its investigation into
the arrest within hours of its occurrence; (3) several police reports were
individually prepared by the participating officers shortly after the
arrest; and (4) the police captain in charge of the district knew of the
arrest and the various police reports. 164 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
summarily held that these facts did not demonstrate actual notice.165
None of the facts indicated that Felder intended to bring suit against the
city.166
Notwithstanding the result in Felder, one should not read the case to
mean that the content requirement of the actual notice exception is diffi-
161. Craney v. Pacetti, No. 90-CV-367 (Wis. Ct. App. Dist. II June 3, 1992).
162. 139 Wis. 2d 614, 408 N.W.2d 19 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
163. lIe at 617,408 N.W.2d at 21. Felder, a black man, alleged that the beating and arrest
were racially motivated and thus a violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at
617-18, 408 N.W.2d at 21.
164. 1l at 628-29, 408 N.W.2d at 25-26.
165. l& at 630, 408 N.W.2d at 26.
166. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Bablitch argued that the city received actual notice
under the statute. Id. at 634,408 N.W.2d at 28. Implicitly equating the actual notice exception
to the doctrine of substantial compliance, Justice Bablitch concluded that the "purpose [of the
statute] was more than fulfilled in this case. If these facts and circumstances do not constitute
actual notice under the statute, 'actual notice' has become meaningless." Id.
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cult to satisfy. 67 Again, actual notice demands only a document that
recites the facts giving rise to the injury and indicates an intent to hold
the city responsible.'1 Most plaintiffs will have little difficulty comply-
ing with such minimal content requirements. However, the exception
fails to ameliorate the harshness of the notice requirement when a plain-
tiff unwittingly makes no attempt to comply, as in Felder.'69 Thus,
although the actual notice standard is not difficult to satisfy, it neverthe-
less represents a hurdle for municipal tort victims to clear.' 70
2. Competing Interpretations of Timely Notice
Under Wisconsin's municipal notice of claim statute, the failure to
provide written notice within 120 days after the event giving rise to the
claim is fatal to the claim unless the plaintiff can show that the munici-
pality had actual notice and was not prejudiced by the delay or lack of
standard written notice.17' However, the statute is ambiguous with re-
spect to whether the municipality must receive actual notice within the
same 120-day period as standard written notice. Although virtually all
Wisconsin courts have effectively extended the statutory notice period
under the guise of the actual notice exception, a few Wisconsin courts
have interpreted the statute differently.172
167. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 155 n.3 (1988) (White, J., concurring). Justice
White expressed that, based on the facts in Felder, the actual notice requirement of § 893.80 is
difficult to satisfy. Id.
168. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
169. 139 Wis. 2d 614, 408 N.W.2d 19 (1987).
170. Justice O'Connor has argued that Wis. STAT. § 893.80(1)(a) is not a "sufficiently bur-
densome notice of claim requirement [that] could effectively act as a statute of limitations."
Felder, 487 U.S. 131, 162 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In this regard, however, Justice
O'Connor misses the mark. A statute of limitations is not a burdensome requirement because
it sets out some complex means by which one must comply. Rather a statute of limitations is
burdensome because of its finality when someone does not attempt to comply, because they
were unaware of the deadline or otherwise. Similarly, the notice of claim statute is burden-
some because it too has a harsh finality if the plaintiff does not attempt to comply.
171. Wis. STAT. § 893.80(1) (1991-92).
172. See Medley v. City of Milwaukee, 969 F.2d 312, 320 (7th Cir. 1992); Brockert v.
Skornicka, 711 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1983) (dicta); Craney v. Pacetti, No. 90-CV-367 (Wis. Ct.
App. Dist. II June 3, 1992); Rhyner v. Sauk County, No. 83-1777 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985). Some
courts outside Wisconsin have also been reluctant to apply such exceptions in a manner that
would extend the statutory notice period. See, eg., Kelly v. City of Rochester, 231 N.W.2d 275
(Minn. 1975) (holding that only actual notice within the notice period excuses late notice);
Bell v. Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport Bd., 427 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (holding
that actual notice must be within statutory notice period).
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a. Actual Notice Anytime Without Prejudice
Two Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions form the touchstone for the
predominant view that no time limit applies to actual notice. In Weiss v.
City of Milwaukee, 3 the plaintiff allowed more than two years to pass
before providing the city with a notice of claim for damages.174 Without
discussion, the supreme court held that the tardy notice of claim consti-
tuted actual notice under the statute. 175 The court also summarily con-
cluded that the city was not prejudiced by the lack of timely notice. 176
In Nielsen v. Town of Silver Cliff,'77 a young child was playing on
property owned by the defendant municipality when a large stone monu-
ment fell on her leg.178 Her father managed to lift the monument from
her leg, but injured his back in the process. 179 Although notice of the
child's injuries was received within 120 days, no notice of the father's
injuries was received until approximately one year after the incident, at
which time he submitted a claim for damages.180 Reaffirming Weiss,'
the supreme court in Nielsen held that the father's claim for damages
constituted actual notice under the statute and that the delay in notice
was not prejudicial to the municipality.' s2
Actual notice must satisfy the same basic content requirements as
requisite written notice. 8 3 By accepting actual notice beyond the notice
173. 79 Wis. 2d 213, 255 N.W.2d 496 (1977).
174. hi at 213, 255 N.W.2d at 499.
175. Id
176. Itt at 228, 255 N.W.2d at 501. One possible explanation for the court's cursory treat-
ment of the notice statute is that the court also held, after lengthy discussion, that the defend-
ant was not negligent as a matter of law. Id at 234, 255 N.W.2d at 504. Thus, arguably, the
court did not fully consider whether extending the statutory notice period would defeat the
purposes of the statute.
177. 112 Wis. 2d 574, 334 N.W.2d 242 (1983).
178. Id at 575, 334 N.W.2d at 243.
179. Id at 576, 334 N.W.2d at 243.
180. Id
181. In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court resolved that "Weiss establishes
that... a... claim may be preserved by actual notice received more than 120 days after the
event causing the injury provided the claimant shows that the failure to give timely written
notice was not prejudicial to the municipality." Nielsen, 112 Wis. 2d at 581,334 N.W.2d at 245.
Prior to Nielsen, whether actual notice had a time limitation was unsettled. For example,
in Elkhorn v. East Troy Community Sch. Dist., 110 Wis. 2d 1, 2, 327 N.W.2d 206,207, the court
held that "because East Troy had neither written notice nor actual knowledge of Elkhorn's
claim within 120 days after the event giving rise to it, Elkhorn did not comply with sec.
893.80(1)(a)." Id. (emphasis added).
182. Nielsen, 112 Wis. 2d at 582, 334 N.W.2d at 246.
183. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
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period, Nielsen made "prejudice" the linchpin of the notice statute. In-
deed, Nielsen states:
The purpose of [the statute] is to avoid prejudice to governmental
units resulting from the late filing of claims. Specifically, the no-
tice requirements are designed to ensure that governmental units
have a sufficient opportunity to investigate.... [Thus,] actual no-
tice.., does not need a time limit because a subjective showing of
no prejudice assures that the statute's purpose has been satisfied
regardless of when actual notice is received.'8
4
Hence, under Nielsen, courts may determine whether the statute's gen-
eral purpose has been satisfied without directly considering all of the
traditional, more specific purposes of the statute. 85 Prejudice is the
linchpin because so long as no prejudice has occurred to the municipal-
ity, the purpose of the statute has been satisfied, and the actual notice
exception may be invoked. 186
In light of the foregoing, the obvious question to be addressed is
what constitutes prejudice under the statute.187 Although courts no
longer need to directly consider whether the traditional purposes of the
statute have been satisfied, those purposes have been used to justify a
finding of prejudice or no prejudice. For example, the Nielsen court
based its finding of no prejudice on three grounds: first, the municipality
was not impaired in its investigation of the incident; second, the munici-
pality was not impaired in its ability to settle the claim; and third, the
municipality was not prejudiced in its defense. 88 According to the
court, the city had "ample opportunity to investigate [the] claim after
184. Nielsen, 112 Wis. 2d at 580, 334 N.W.2d at 245 (emphasis added). Although the
language "regardless of when actual notice is received" implies that actual notice has abso-
lutely no time constraint, the court later indicated that the two year time period accepted in
Weiss marks or at least approaches the boundary of the extended notice period. Nielsen, 112
Wis. 2d at 581-82, 334 N.W.2d at 246.
185. See supra notes 86-103 and accompanying text.
186. The receipt of timely requisite notice creates a conclusive presumption of no preju-
dice. Nielsen, 112 Wis. 2d at 580,334 N.W.2d at 245. Because actual notice is substantially the
same as requisite notice, see Felder v. Casey, 139 Wis. 2d 614, 630, 408 N.W.2d 19, 26 (1987),
rev'd, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), the receipt of actual notice within the statutory notice period
should also create a conclusive presumption of no prejudice.
187. The statute itself is silent on the issue. See Wis. STAT. § 893.80(1)(a) (1991-92).
Whether a municipality has suffered prejudice is a mixed question of fact and law. Olson v.
Township of Spooner, 133 Wis. 2d 371, 378, 395 N.W.2d 808, 811 (Ct. App. 1986). The trial
court's factual findings must be upheld unless clearly erroneous, but "[h]ow the facts fit the
statutory concept of 'prejudice' is a question of law." Id. at 379, 395 N.W.2d at 811.
188. Nielsen, 112 Wis. 2d at 581-82, 334 N.W.2d at 246.
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receiving actual notice.... Earlier notice would have made no apprecia-
ble difference." 8 9
Purporting to advance a more concrete standard, the court of appeals
in Olsen v. Township of Spooner'90 later defined prejudice as "the inabil-
ity of a party to adequately defend a claim."'191 In so doing, however, the
Olsen court also relegated the purpose of section 893.80(1)(a) to ensur-
ing that municipalities can adequately defend a claim. Thus, whenever a
municipality can adequately defend, the purpose of the statute is met
and, under Nielsen, the actual notice exception may be invoked. 19
Applying its novel definition to the facts before it, the Olsen court
upheld the trial court's conclusion that the municipality received actual
notice of the plaintiff's claim, but was prejudiced by the three-year lag
between the event giving rise to the claim and the receipt of actual no-
tice.' 93 The decision turned on the fact that during the three-year lag
material evidence had vanished. 194 Hence, Olsen can fairly be read as
stating that a municipality suffers prejudice when material evidence, or
presumably a material witness, vanishes as a result of the claimant's fail-
ure to strictly comply with the statute.
b. Actual Notice Confined to Statutory Notice Period
Despite the holding in Nielsen, a minority interpretation of the actual
notice exception recently has arisen in Wisconsin. Under this interpreta-
tion, actual notice must be received within the same 120-day period as
standard written notice. 95 Although the decisions embracing the minor-
ity interpretation have generally failed to justify their departure from
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. 133 Wis. 2d 371,395 N.W.2d 808 (1986). Olsen acknowledged that "[o]pinions apply-
ing sec. 893.80(1)(a) have typically treated the prejudice question summarily, listing facts, then
declaring whether these facts supported a finding of prejudice." Id. at 379 n.4, 395 N.W.2d at
811 n.4. (citing as an example Weiss v. City of Milwaukee, 79 Wis. 2d 213, 227-28, 255 N.W.2d
496, 501 (1977)).
191. Id. at 379, 395 N.W.2d at 811-12 (borrowing definition from United States v. Eight-
een Thousand Five Hundred and Five Dollars and Ten Cents ($18,505.10), 739 F.2d 354, 356
(8th Cir. 1984)).
192. Although Olsen sought to delineate the meaning of prejudice, its only effect was to
rephrase the pivotal issue. Before Olsen, the issue was whether the municipality was
prejudiced. After Olsen the issue is whether the municipality is unable to adequately defend.
193. Olsen, 133 Wis. 2d at 380, 395 N.W.2d at 812.
194. Id
195. See Medley v. City of Milwaukee, 969 F.2d 312, 320 (7th Cir. 1992); Brockert v.
Skornicka, 711 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1983) (dicta); Craney v. Pacetti, No. 90-CV-367 (Wis. Ct.
App. Dist. II June 3, 1992); Rhyner v. Sauk County, No. 83-1777 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1985).
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Nielsen 96 and are of no precedential value in Wisconsin, they prompt
important questions concerning whether the courts have been consistent
in their reasoning and whether they have effectively allowed the actual
notice exception to swallow the 120-day written notice rule.
After distinguishing Nielsen on questionable grounds,197 the court of
appeals, in an unpublished decision, held that actual notice must occur
within 120 days, because "[t]o hold otherwise would lead to absurd re-
sults and would render superfluous the requirement of written notice
within 120 days." '198 The court of appeals reasoned that a claimant could
simply file a tardy notice with the municipality at any time prior to the
running of the statute of limitations and argue that the late notice did
not prejudice the municipality. 199 Under a narrow definition of preju-
dice, this reasoning has merit.
In addition, while not discussed by any court, allowing actual notice
beyond the statutory notice period arguably conflicts with Renner v.
Madison General Hospital.200 As discussed earlier, Renner held that re-
laxing the notice time requirement would defeat the purpose of the state
notice of claim statute.201 Because the state notice of claim statute and
the municipal notice of claim statute share the same purposes,202 it
would seem that relaxing the notice time requirement under the munici-
pal notice statute would defeat its purpose as well. 20 3 Furthermore, al-
lowing actual notice beyond the statutory notice period arguably
conflicts with the supreme court's distinction between requirements con-
cerning the act of filing and those concerning the contents of the docu-
ment after it is Mfled.2°4
196. For example, the Seventh Circuit recently held that "actual notice must be received
within the same 120 days as the written notice." Medley, 969 F.2d at 320. However, the court
failed to cite any cases or provide any reasoning to support its position.
197. In Craney, the court of appeals distinguished Nielsen on the grounds that Nielsen
involved Wis. STAT. § 893.43 (1975), which required notice of the "time, place and circum-
stances of the injury or damage." The statute was subsequently repealed and recreated with
the language "circumstances of the claim" replacing "time, place and circumstances of the
injury or damage." 1977 Wis. Laws 285. The court held that the change in the language was
sufficient to permit a different result than that reached in Nielsen. This change in the lan-
guage, however, does not change any of the reasoning in Nielsen; nor does it allow for a
contrary result.
198. Craney v. Pacetti, No. 90-CV-367 (Wis. Ct. App. Dist. II June 3, 1992).
199. id.
200. 151 Wis. 2d 885, 447 N.W.2d 97 (Ct. App. 1989).
201. Id. at 889, 447 N.W.2d at 98-99; see also supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
204. See Rabe v. Outagamie County, 72 Wis. 2d 492, 501,241 N.W.2d 428,433 (1976); see
also supra notes 136-37.
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c. Interpretation Under Analogous State Statutes
Minnesota and Texas have notice of claim statutes that are similar to
section 893.80 of the Wisconsin Statutes.2 °5 The courts of both states
have consistently required that some actual notice be given within the
statutory notice period before the exception may be invoked.20 6
Although other state courts hold contrary to Minnesota and Texas,2"7 the
reasoning of the Texas and Minnesota courts is persuasive because their
notice statutes are nearly identical to section 893.80(1) of the Wisconsin
Statutes.
The reasoning in Bell v. Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport Board208
is particularly relevant here. In Bell, the plaintiff argued that the statu-
tory actual notice exception does not require actual notice to be received
within the statutory notice period.20 9 The court disagreed, holding that
without knowledge that is substantially equivalent to the knowledge pro-
vided by formal notice, "the governmental defendant cannot reasonably
anticipate that an injured party will assert a claim and, therefore, has no
opportunity to investigate on a timely basis and to attempt to settle the
claim short of litigation as is intended by the [statute]."21 0 Furthermore,
while the terms of the Texas statute are to be liberally construed,
the above interpretation of "actual notice" would appear to be as
liberal as can be devised if the formal notice requirement is to
retain any force. It is a basic principle of statutory construction
that a provision of a statute will not be interpreted so as to render
nugatory another provision unless such result cannot be avoided.
205. See MINN. STAT. § 466.05 (Supp. 1993); Tx. CODE ANN. § 41-4-16 (1992).
206. See, e.g., Bell v. Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport Bd., 427 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Tex.
1977); Kelly v. City of Rochester, 231 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1975); Jenkins v. Board of Educ.,
228 N.W.2d 265 (Minn. 1975); Woomer v. City of Galveston, 765 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988).
207. Some jurisdictions permit substantial compliance with the filing time requirements in
their notice of claim statute. See, e.g., Yurechko v. County of Allegheny, 243 A.2d 372, 377
(Pa. 1968) (extending statutory notice period because no prejudice to municipality occurred).
However, the language used in notice of claim statutes varies from state to state, making a
relevant comparison of the law in each state nearly impossible. Nonetheless, Reynolds reports
that in most jurisdictions, "the notice must be given within the time specified by the relevant
legislation; filing even one day late will bar a claim. REYNOLDS, supra note 117, at 701.
208. 427 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Tex. 1977). In Nielsen v. Town of Silver Cliff, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals cited Bell with approval, holding that actual notice must be received within
120 days after the event causing injury. Nielsen v. Town of Silver Cliff, No. 81-1390, 1982 WL
172323 (Wis. Ct. App. July 6, 1982), rev'd, 112 Wis. 2d 574, 334 N.W.2d 242 (1983). In revers-
ing, the supreme court implicitly rejected the reasoning in Bell, but did not mention the case
specifically. See Nielsen, 112 Wis. 2d at 582, 334 N.W.2d at 246.
209. Bell, 427 F. Supp. at 929.
210. Id. at 930.
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The overly liberal interpretation of "actual notice" urged by the
Plaintiff would defeat the purpose of the Legislature in enacting a
notice provision.211
3. Analysis
Under section 893.80(1)(a) of the Wisconsin Statutes, the plaintiff
must provide the defendant with written notice within 120 days. The
plaintiff may invoke an exception to this rule by demonstrating actual
notice coupled with a separate finding of no prejudice. Because "actual
notice" is the basic equivalent of formal written notice, prejudice is the
linchpin in determining when the exception may be invoked. Hence,
under a sufficiently narrow definition of prejudice, the exception would
swallow the rule and thereby render it superfluous. Allowing the excep-
tion to swallow the rule would, in turn, evidence a belief on the part of
the majority of Wisconsin courts that the purposes of the statute are
either generally satisfied irrespective of when notice is given or are un-
deserving of enforcement.
Wisconsin courts generally have used the exception to extend the
statutory notice period. In Weiss, the supreme court invoked the excep-
tion despite a two-year lag between the event giving rise to the claim and
the receipt of notice.212 There is no logical reason for the 120-day re-
quirement if notice may be given two years after the event giving rise to
the claim. The purpose of the statute is to allow the municipality to
promptly investigate when the facts are fresh. Arguably, facts are no
more fresh after two years than they would be under the three-year per-
sonal injury statute of limitations.
In Nielsen, the supreme court invoked the exception despite a one-
year lag between the event giving rise to the claim and the receipt of
notice. The court reasoned that the municipality had "ample opportu-
nity to investigate [the] claim after receiving actual notice.... Earlier
notice would have made no appreciable difference." '213 This reasoning
clearly demonstrates that the court believes that the purposes are gener-
ally satisfied regardless of when notice is received.214
211. Id.
212. Weiss v. City of Milwaukee, 79 Wis. 2d 213, 255 N.W.2d 496 (1977).
213. Nielsen v. Town of Silver Cliff, 112 Wis. 2d 574, 581-82, 334 N.W.2d 242, 246
(1983)(emphasis added).
214. Although the facts in Nielsen underpin the court's statement, they are by no means
unusual. The municipality became aware of the incident-by information not constituting
actual notice-within four days, and sent a representative to the scene to investigate. Id. at
582,334 N.W.2d at 246. Hence, the investigation was not impaired. Similarly, there was noth-
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Finally, in Olsen, the court of appeals emasculated the 120-day notice
rule by narrowly defining prejudice as the inability to adequately defend
a claim.215 Because municipalities will rarely be unable to adequately
defend a claim, the court's definition of prejudice makes the actual no-
tice exception readily accessible and, therefore, obviates the need for
formal written notice in most cases.
As the foregoing demonstrates, Weiss and its progeny have allowed
the exception to swallow the rule. Moreover, by so doing, the courts
seem to have acknowledged that the purposes of the statute will gener-
ally be satisfied irrespective of when notice is given to the municipality.
This understanding provides a new perspective for analyzing whether the
traditional purposes of the Wisconsin notice of claim statute justify plac-
ing municipalities into a privileged class of defendants. In addition, it
confirms that Wisconsin is continuing on its clear course away from gov-
ernmental immunity.
V. CONCLUSION
Wisconsin's municipal notice of claim statute blatantly discriminates
in a manner detrimental to the victim of a municipal tort.216 Many mu-
nicipal tort victims will fail to appreciate the relatively short window
within which they must provide notice to preserve their claim.217 While
most should be able to invoke the actual notice exception, a few victims
will inevitably be barred from recovery for failure to strictly comply with
the 120-day time limitation.218
The general purpose of the notice statute is to ensure that municipali-
ties can adequately defend a claim. Specifically, the statute seeks to pro-
vide municipal defendants with an opportunity to quickly investigate and
amicably compromise claims without litigation. The courts have implic-
itly acknowledged that these purposes are generally served in the ab-
sence of a notice of claim requirement. As expressed in Nielsen v. Town
of Silver Cliff,219 municipal defendants, in the absence of compliance
ing unusual with regard to the municipality's ability to settle. The court simply noted that the
city had ample time from the date it received actual notice until the date of trial to reach a
settlement. Ia&
215. Olsen v. Township of Spooner, 133 Wis. 2d 371,379, 395 N.W.2d 808, 811-12 (1986).
216. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 146 (1988).
217. 1&
218. See, e.g., Medley v. City of Milwaukee, 969 F.2d 312, 320 (7th Cir. 1992); Ocampo v.
City of Racine, 28 Wis. 2d 506, 137 N.W.2d 477 (1965); Craney v. Pacetti, No. 90-CV-367 (Wis.
Ct. App. Dist. II June 3, 1992); Rhyner v. Sauk County, No. 83-1777 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 25,
1985).
219. 112 Wis. 2d 574, 334 N.W.2d 242 (1983).
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with the statute, still have ample opportunity to effect a settlement prior
to engaging in a costly lawsuit.220 In any event, while facilitating com-
promise and settlement is a favorite of the law, such an objective should
not be pursued at the expense of innocent victims of municipal torts. In
light of the statute's relatively weak justifications, the preclusion of any
valid claims resulting from the failure to comply with the notice of claim
requirement is unacceptable. Accordingly, Wisconsin should abandon
the notice of claim requirement in the municipal notice of claim statute.
Wisconsin's municipal notice of claim statute is nothing more than an
antiquated remnant of the universally berated doctrine of governmental
immunity.2 1 The purposes underpinning the notice of claim statute mir-
ror those that once supported governmental immunity in this state.'
There were no tenable justifications to save the doctrine of governmen-
tal immunity from abolition, and none exist to save its descendant. Wis-
consin has long acknowledged the social desirability of spreading losses
rather than denying a remedy to an innocent claimant.22 The 120-day
notice requirement in Wisconsin's municipal notice of claim statute is
antithetical to that socially desirable purpose and, accordingly, should be
abandoned.
MICHAEL J. WALDSPURGER
220. Id at 582, 334 N.W.2d at 246.
221. See Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 33, 115 N.W.2d 618, 621 (1962).
222. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 143 (1988).
223. See Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 34, 115 N.W.2d at 622.

